The â€œInternet Radio Fairness Actâ€ has a lot to concern artists. Today, weâ€™re continuing our section-by-section analysis of the proposed legislation because knowing is half the battle. Weâ€™ve been looking at how the bill would affect current law: strikethrough text shows what the bill would remove, while underlined text shows what it would add.
SEC. 5. PROMOTION OF A COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE.
17 USC Â§ 112 â€“ Limitations on exclusive rights: Ephemeral recordings
(e)Â Statutory License.â€”
(2)Â Notwithstanding any provision of the antitrust laws, any copyright owners of sound recordings and any transmitting organizations entitled to a statutory license under this subsection may negotiate and agree upon royalty rates and license terms and conditions for making phonorecords of such sound recordings under this section and the proportionate division of fees paid among copyright owners, and may designate common agents, on a nonexclusive basis, to negotiate, agree to, pay, or receive such royalty payments. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to permit any copyright owners of sound recordings acting jointly, or any common agent or collective representing such copyright owners, to take any action that would prohibit, interfere with, or impede direct licensing by copyright owners of sound recordings in competition with licensing by any common agent or collective, and any such action that affects interstate commerce shall be deemed a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1).
17 USC Â§ 114 â€“ Scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings
(e) Authority for Negotiations.â€”
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of the antitrust laws, in negotiating statutory licenses in accordance with subsection (f), any copyright owners of sound recordings and any entities performing sound recordings affected by this section may negotiate and agree upon the royalty rates and license terms and conditions for the performance of such sound recordings and the proportionate division of fees paid among copyright owners, and may designate common agents on a nonexclusive basis to negotiate, agree to, pay, or receive payments.
(2) For licenses granted under section 106 (6), other than statutory licenses, such as for performances by interactive services or performances that exceed the sound recording performance complementâ€”
(A) copyright owners of sound recordings affected by this section may designate common agents to act on their behalf to grant licenses and receive and remit royalty payments: Provided, That each copyright owner shall establish the royalty rates and material license terms and conditions unilaterally, that is, not in agreement, combination, or concert with other copyright owners of sound recordings; and
(B) entities performing sound recordings affected by this section may designate common agents to act on their behalf to obtain licenses and collect and pay royalty fees: Provided, That each entity performing sound recordings shall determine the royalty rates and material license terms and conditions unilaterally, that is, not in agreement, combination, or concert with other entities performing sound recordings.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to permit any copyright owners of sound recordings acting jointly, or any common agent or collective representing such copyright owners, to take any action that would prohibit, interfere with, or impede direct licensing by copyright owners of sound recordings in competition with licensing by any common agent or collective, and any such action that affects interstate commerce shall be deemed a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1).
(4) In order to obtain the benefits of paragraph (1), a common agent or collective representing copyright owners of sound recordings must make available at no charge through publicly accessible computer access through the Internet the most current available list of sound recording copyright owners represented by the organization and the most current list of sound recordings licensed by the organization.
This section is far more troubling than it first appears.
The effect of IRFA as a whole would be to reduce the amount of royalties that companies like Clear Channel, Sirius XM Radio, and Pandora have to pay to recording artists.
For most companies, arrangements between buyers and sellers are negotiated on the open market. But for a number of reasons, the Copyright Act establishes a compulsory license for certain uses of digital sound recordings with the license terms and rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board.
So companies like Sirius XM and Pandora already have an advantage that many businesses donâ€™t have: government-guaranteed access to the content that drives their business at a rate set by law. Compulsory licensing is compulsory: there is no opting in or opting out for artists.
But compulsory licensing doesnâ€™t preclude direct licensing under the current law â€” that is, without IRFA. Copyright owners are â€” and always have been â€” free to negotiate privately with copyright users. Sirius XM has been particularly aggressive in recent years in pursuing such direct licensing, and Clear Channel is right behind Sirius with their own direct deals.
What does this mean for artists? First of all, in practice, this means that the rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board act as a ceiling â€” no licensee is going to pay more than the compulsory rate. They are guaranteed access to every sound recording on the market at the CRBâ€™s rates.
So why would recording artists or sound recording owners want to accept a deal that gives, say, Sirius XM more rights for less money?Â (Bearing in mind that many artists own their sound recordings.)
Hereâ€™s one reason. During recent proceedings, Sirius XM Executive VP David Frear testified that â€œAmong other things, [record companies] recognized that by entering into direct licenses with Sirius XM, they gained the potential for enhanced airplay and greater exposure for their recording artists.â€ Left unsaid was the corollary to this: refusing to enter into a direct license could mean less (or no) airplay.
Direct licensing, in conjunction with a compulsory licensing scheme, thus gives licensees all stick and no carrot. And when youâ€™re terrestrial radio giant Clear Channel, or the only satellite radio provider, or Pandora â€” which accounts for 37% of all digital sound recording royalties â€” thatâ€™s a pretty big stick. (Pandora and Sirius XM together account for 90%.)
Section 5 of IRFA is perhaps the most pernicious part of the bill, for it would make it illegal for anyone to criticize digital sound recording licensees. If IRFA becomes law, artists and artist organizations will need to watch what they say in public in opposition to Sirius and Clear Channelâ€™s direct licensing efforts.
This is not an exaggeration or hyperbole â€” it is already happening. The provisions of Section 5 seem to be a direct response to groups like American Association of Independent Music (A2IM), SoundExchange, and major record labels cautioning recording artists about the drawbacks to a push by Sirius XM to license recordings directly following the latest rate-setting proceedings.
In March 2012, Sirius XM filed a lawsuit against SoundExchange and A2IM alleging anti-trust violations for their efforts to resist what SoundExchange and A2IM saw as a raw deal from Sirius XMâ€™s direct licensing push. Now, for starters, it might seem odd that a company with an effective monopoly on satellite radio is complaining that a non-profit nonexclusive collecting agency and a trade association representing hundreds of small companies are violating anti-trust laws.
But the allegations that Sirius made in the lawsuit should concern any artist. Sirius XM essentially argues that various public communications concerning its direct license program amount to anti-competitive behavior â€” not anti-competitive conduct, just speech.
In general statutory licenses have been good for the independent music label community as statutory licenses insure that all music label copyrights, whether those of the major labels or those of independent labels or artists, are treated equally and paid the same rate amount for each stream (play) of that music. Under direct licenses there are cases where independents have received less than equitable rates.
And lest you think only industry groups would be caught in the crosshairs, itâ€™s not unlikely that artist advocacy organizations could face legal liability. Sirius XM also refers to a statement made by the Future of Music Coalition, in its November 2011 newsletter:
Here at FMC, we want artists to get the money theyâ€™re owed for the use of their music on any platform. The statutory rate for digital performance plus direct payment via SoundExchange is an important piece of the compensation puzzle for creators. Bypassing it might benefit the bottom lines of major corporations in the short run, but itâ€™s a dangerous thing for performing artists.
This is the type of explanatory speech â€” not conduct â€” that Sirius XM thinks is illegal and IRFA definitely would outlaw. Again, it would make it a violation of the Sherman Act for â€œany copyright owners of sound recordings acting jointly, or any common agent or collective representing such copyright owners, to take any action that would prohibit, interfere with, or impede direct licensing.â€Â Whenever two or more artists are gathered, Sirius XM (and Clear Channel, and Google) will be there.
The statements above are already alleged by Sirius XM to violate existing anti-trust laws. To be clear, the allegations are absurd â€” these statements are clearly not urging an unlawful â€œboycottâ€ against Sirius XMâ€™s direct licensing, and even if they were, Sirius doesnâ€™t lose out since it already has access to every sound recording on the market under the compulsory license.Â Thereâ€™s also a much simpler and way less conspiratorial explanation to the public response that Sirius complains of: maybe the labels who spurned Sirius XMâ€™s proposal just didnâ€™t like the deal. But Section 5 of IRFA would ensure that the law explicitly prohibits any criticism of direct licensing deals.
So if IRFA becomes law, if you donâ€™t like the deal, you better keep it to yourself.